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Abstract
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In the past three decades, emerging countries have 
gone through extensive decentralization reforms. Yet, 
there are no studies assessing quantitatively the relative 
importance of various factors known to affect the success 
of decentralization. This paper builds on a comprehensive 
dataset the authors constructed for Peru, which merges 
municipal fiscal accounts with information about 
municipalities’ characteristics such as population, poverty, 
education, and local politics. The paper then analyzes 
the leading factors affecting the ability of municipalities 
to execute the allocated budget using complementary 
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methodologies, from least squares to quantile regression 
analyses. According to the existing literature and the 
Peruvian context, the analysis divides these factors into 
four categories: the budget size and allocation process; local 
capacity; local needs; and political economy constraints. 
Although all four factors affect decentralization, the 
largest determinant of spending ability is the adequacy 
of the budget with respect to local capacity. The results 
confirm the need for decentralization to be implemented 
gradually over time in parallel with strong capacity 
building efforts.  
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I.  Introduction 
In the last three decades, emerging countries have gone through extensive decentralization 
reforms that devolved fiscal and administrative authority to regional and local governments. 
The underlying and widespread belief behind these reforms is that local jurisdictions remain 
“more accountable” to the people and are in a better position to understand and address the 
needs  of  the  local  population  (Oates,  1999).  But  little  is  understood  about  how  a 
decentralization program should be sequenced and implemented (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez, 
2006). Political economy considerations have often pushed for rushed implementation, leaving 
little space for experimenting and tailoring, and leading to mixed successes. In sum, evidence of 
a  positive  impact  of  decentralization  reforms  in  low  and  middle  income  countries  remains 
mixed (Smoke, 2001). 
Recent  analyses  that  studied  decentralization  reforms  suggest  that  decentralization 
requires  a  significant  set  of  prerequisites  that  are  often  lacking  in  developing  countries 
(Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006). Prerequisites include educated and politically aware voters, 
the prevalence of law and order, fair election and effective political competition, a capable local 
administration,  and  the  prevalence  of  effective  oversight  mechanisms.  Because  of  data 
constraints, most studies on fiscal decentralization remain however of qualitative nature, or 
only consider selected constraints to decentralization abstracting from the broader context. 
Yet,  while  there  are  many  factors  affecting  decentralization,  some  are  bound  to  be  more 
important  than  others,  but  to  the  best  of  our  knowledge  no  study  has  yet  compared  the 
relative importance of each prerequisite in affecting decentralization outcomes. 
This  paper  attempts  to  disentangle  how  different  factors  such  as  institutional  capacity, 
political  economy,  and  structural  characteristics  are  playing  out  in  the  decentralization  of 
spending to  local  governments  (in  particular  municipalities)  in Peru.  The paper builds  on a 
comprehensive  dataset  we  have  constructed  that  merges  municipal  fiscal  accounts  with 
information  at  the  municipal  level  about  municipalities’  characteristics  such  as  population, 
poverty, education and local politics to analyze leading factors affecting the outcomes of the 
decentralization process.  We conduct the empirical analysis using complementary statistical 3 
 
methodologies, from least squares to quantile regression analyses. 
Drawing from experience in other Latin American countries, officials in Peru attempted to 
cope  with  some  of  the  pitfalls  of  decentralization  reforms  by  imposing  strong  fiduciary 
requirements to local governments, and, to guarantee local and transparent planning, designed 
guidelines on participatory budgeting that require elected municipal authorities to consult with 
civil society in planning the budget. As a result, many municipalities are struggling to abide with 
the complexity of the newly drafted regulation and often do not manage to spend the budget 
that has been allocated to them. The Peruvian decentralization process contrasts therefore 
with  the  outcomes  of  reforms  in  other  countries,  where  the  main  issue  often  relates  to 
irresponsive  spending  due  to  soft  budget  constraints  (Rodden  et  al.,  2003).  Because  of  its 
peculiarity, it allows studying with greater precision factors that under soft budget constraints 
and excessive spending may be difficult to identify. 
We  classify  constraints  to  municipalities’  spending  ability  into  four  broad  categories,  in 
accordance with both the existing literature, and the Peruvian context: the budget size and 
allocation  process;  local  capacity;  local  needs;  and  political  economy  constraints.  The 
importance  of  capacity  and  political  economy  constraints  in  influencing  decentralization 
outcomes has been widely discussed in the literature (see below, next section, for details): poor 
capacity  of  the  local  administration  and  local  elite  capture  are  almost  always  cited  as  the 
leading culprits of failed decentralization reforms. In addition, because of the design of the 
reform and the massive amounts of resources that have been channeled to municipalities, in 
the  Peruvian  context  the  size  of  the  budget  and  the  related  allocation  process  also  affect 
considerably spending ability. Finally, “local needs” reflects the degree of development, and the 
easiness with which municipalities can identify projects that are smaller in scale and can be 
realized more rapidly. The large variation in the demonstrated ability to spend across the 1834 
municipalities  in  Peru  will  provide  an  invaluable  testing  ground  for  assessing  the  relative 
relevance of each factor. 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the Peruvian decentralization 
reform and the related literature. Section III discusses the data sources and the methodology; 
Section IV presents the empirical results; and Section V concludes. 4 
 
II.  Context and literature 
The Peruvian decentralization process began relatively late, with the 2002 Constitutional 
reform. To avoid the fiscal crises that had plagued earlier episodes of decentralization in Latin 
America, decentralization in Peru was heavily anchored around fiscal neutrality. The ability to 
borrow of sub-national governments (which include regions, provinces and municipalities) was 
strictly limited by law, and the central government imposed strong fiduciary requirements for 
spending  (such  as  the  need  to  submit  proposals  and  receive  clearance  from  the  central 
government for large capital investments). For municipalities, a law on participatory budgeting 
was also passed requiring local authorities, who are elected every four years, to consult each 
year with their constituency and civil society in planning the budget. However, in part because 
of  rushed  implementation,  few  mechanisms  have  been  put  in  place  to  oversee  and  train 
municipalities in local administration practices. As a result, municipalities have been somewhat 
“left on their own,” and while some have thriven, many municipalities are struggling to spend 
the budget  that has  been  allocated  to  them. Depending  on  the  source  and type of funds, 
municipalities spent in 2009 an average of between 63 and 97 percent of the allocated budget 
(Figure 1). 
There is however a great variation in municipal spending rates depending on the type and 
source of funds. Municipalities spend quite a significant amount of the budget allocated for 
current expenditures (on average, 88 percent of it), while they spend lower amounts of their 
allocation for capital expenditures. And spending records vary even more significantly by source 
of funds: most municipalities spend most of the “ordinary” budget that has been allocated to 
them, but they lag behind in spending the “defined” (or earmarked) allocation, to which the 
majority  of  allocated  funds  for  capital  expenditures  tend  to  belong.  The  reason  for  this 
difference in spending rates is apparent given the key distinction between ordinary and defined 
sources of funds: if the ordinary budget remains unspent at the end of the year it is returned to 




Figure 1: Average Actual Expenditures vs. Allocated Budget 
per Municipality, 2009 
 
Note: Data are in thousands Nuevo Soles. As of December 31, 2009, 1 
Peruvian Nuevo Sol = 0.35 US Dollar. Source: Authors’ calculations based 
on data from Ministry of Economics and Finance (MEF). 
 
There  is  also  considerable  variability  in  municipalities’  spending  patterns  (Figure  2), 
which do not display any geographic trends: municipalities that are (not) able to spend their 
budget appear to be scattered all across the territory, from the Amazon basin, to Lima, and 
from  North  to  South.  The  lack  of  a  clear-cut  pattern  is  all  the  more  surprising  given  the 
geographic clustering of poverty and other factors such as natural resources that may affect 
governance and political factors. 
In studying determinants of spending ability, we draw both from existing literature and 
the Peruvian context. We classify constraints to spending into four broad categories: the budget 
size and allocation process; local capacity; local needs; and political economy constraints. Both 
the  academic  and  policy  literature  have  widely  documented  the  extent  to  which  capacity 
constraints  and  political  economy  considerations  can  significantly  hamper  the  ability  and 
willingness of local administrations to address the needs of their electorates. Poor capacity of 

















decentralization  (Smoke  and  Lewis,  1996;  Litvack  et  al.,  1998)  and,  accordingly,  qualitative 
reviews of decentralization processes point out that many early decentralization efforts have 
failed because local administrations have been given “too much functional responsibility too 
rapidly and without appropriate capacity building” (Smoke, 2001). More recent quantitative 
evaluations also find that outcomes such as household consumption and school enrolment are 
positively related to capacity of local governments (Steiner, 2010). 
Political economy constraints to decentralization have been subject to an even wider 
academic and policy scrutiny. It is by now widely recognized that local capture, favoritism, 
electoral dynamics, power struggles between central and local politicians and agencies, and 
inter- and intra-party dynamics all affect the design and success of decentralization reforms 
(see, among others, Bardhan, 2002; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 
2006; Olken, 2007; Araujo et al., 2008; Boetti, 2009; and the review in Eaton et al., 2010). 
The Peruvian case appears to be no exception, and anecdotal evidence suggests strong 
capacity  and  political  constraints  to  spending.  Visits  to  municipalities  in  the  regions  of 
Ayacucho, Arequipa and in Lima that we have conducted in the context of this research, as well 
as conversations with leading policymakers, confirmed for instance that small municipalities are 
not able to afford the fixed investment of a qualified engineer that supervises project design, 
tendering and implementation. The size and sophistication of projects may also affect spending, 
though a priori the effect remains ambiguous since larger projects may be more difficult to 
implement, but at the same time consume a larger share of the budget. Similarly, the visits 
suggested  that  high  political  fractionalization  leads  members  of  the  municipal  council  to 
question in public and block some of the mayors’ investment proposals. Because of the focus 
on spending ability, however, binding political constraints to spending may differ from the ones 
identified by the existing literature. In particular, elite capture may not play such a relevant role 




Figure 2: Map of Budget Execution Rates 
of Capital Expenditures, 2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on MEF data. 
 
 
While  capacity  and  political  economy  considerations  have  been  widely  studied,  the 
extent to which the budget size and allocation process, as well as needs, affect spending has 
been less investigated, in part because these features are more specific to the design of the 
Peruvian decentralization reform. Although they do relate to some extent to capacity, they 
have relevance on their own: in fact, our empirical analysis suggests that budget-related issues, 
in particular the adequacy of the transferred budget with respect to the local capacity, are 
among the most important determinants of spending ability. This is of particular relevance for 
Peru, since capacity building and planning are long term investments, but the recent boom in 
commodity prices and generous revenue sharing agreements have spurred transfers to some 
municipalities that may simply not be able to manage the sudden increases in revenues. 
Because  of  some  peculiar  features  of  the  Peruvian  decentralization  reform, 8 
 
municipalities’ needs may also affect spending ability. Our visits suggested that communities 
with  more  basic  needs  may  find  it  easier  to  identify  their  needs  during  stakeholders’ 
consultations, and that the types of projects implemented in these municipalities may ease 
spending since they tend to be smaller, and of simpler design. 
In spite of the strong attention that fiscal decentralization has received in the academic 
and  policy  literature,  existing  quantitative  studies  limit  themselves  at  looking  at  specific 
constraints, and fail to assess the relative importance of the various factors highlighted above. 
On the other hand, more comprehensive studies reviewing factors affecting decentralization, 
which tend to be more of a policy nature (see, among many, Smoke, 2001; Tanzi, 2001; and 
Eaton et al., 2010), remain for the most part qualitative. In this paper we bridge these two 
strands  of  literature  by  assessing  quantitatively  the  relative  importance  of  each  factor  in 
determining spending ability.  In looking at spending ability, our research  also complements 
existing literature looking at the extent to which various factors, such as gender, elite capture, 
or revenues from natural resources affect the type of spending (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 
2004; Araujo et al., 2008; Caselli and Michaels, 2009) and spending efficiency (De Borger and 
Kerstens, 1996; García-Sánchez, 2006; and Balaguer-Coll et al., 2007). While it would be of great 
interest to complement the analysis of spending ability with information on spending efficiency, 
to the best of our knowledge these data currently only exist for high income countries. 
 
III.  Data 
The analysis draws on a combination of particularly rich databases containing information at 
the municipal level. For each of the more than 1,830 municipalities in Peru we have information 
on  public  spending  undertaken  by  the  municipality,  population,  staffing  levels  at  the 
municipality,  poverty,  reported  social  conflicts,  and  a  number  of  features  of  the  political 
process.  
The  public  expenditure  data  at  the  municipal  level  is  particularly  detailed.  For  each 
municipality in Peru we have available the budgeted public spending as well as the actual public 
spending  outlays  for  2007  through  2009.  While  information  is  in  principle  available 9 
 
disaggregated by month in the course of a given year we chose to use only annual aggregates; 
the reason for this decision is the fact that most capital expenditure is concentrated towards 
the  end  of  the  year  and  as  a  result  comparing  periods  other  than  full  years  would  be 
misleading.  This  information  is  available  for  a  large  number  of  possible  cuts,  in  particular 
disaggregated  by  type  of  spending  (i.e.  current  vs.  capital  expenditures).  Crucially,  this 
information is available disaggregated for expenditures that are financed with resources that 
have different types of restrictions attached to them.  A particularly important distinction in the 
Peruvian context is that between ‘ordinary’ and ‘defined’ resources.  If unspent at the end of 
the  year  ordinary  resources  revert  back  to  the  central  government.  In  contrast,  if  defined 
resources are unspent at the end of the year the balance gets reallocated to the municipality in 
the following year’s budget. This is relevant because all revenues related to natural resources 
shared between the different levels of governments by formula are included among the defined 
resources. This municipal public expenditure data has become available due to the roll out of 
the Integrated Financial Management System (Sistema Integrado de Administración Financiera, 
SIAF) in all municipalities in Peru and is currently available on-line – a key element in improving 
accountability to citizens (http://transparencia-economica.mef.gob.pe/amigable/). The Ministry 
of  Economy  and  Finance  kindly  provided  the  data,  including  for  the  years  in  which  SIAF’s 
information was not made available on-line. 
Population data are from the 2007 Census. In addition to the total number of inhabitants 
per  municipality  we  also  know  the  number  of  so-called  ‘populated  centers’  within  a  given 
municipality and the number of people living in each of those populated centers. This allows us 
to exploit the information content in the dispersion of population within a given municipality.  
The  human  resources  of  each  municipality  are  available  through  the  annual  National 
Registry  of  Municipalities  (Registro  Nacional  de  Municipalidades,  RENAMU),  a  census  of 
municipalities run by the National Institute of Statistics. This registry allows us to know not only 
the  total  number  of  staff  working  in  a  given  municipality  but  also  the  type  of  work  they 
perform, whether it is managerial, administrative and technical, or manual and support work. 
The living standards of the population in a given municipality are available thanks to the 
work  produced  by  World  Bank  staff  for  operation  purposes  using  the  Poverty  Maps 10 
 
methodology (Elbers et al., 2003) by combining the 2007 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre 
Condiciones  de  Vida  and  2007  Census  data.  This  allows  us  to  obtain  estimates  of  poverty 
incidence at the municipal level. The same sources of information and methodology also allow 
us to obtain estimates of the average education attainment of the population living in each 
municipality. 
Finally,  the  Jurado  Nacional  de  Elecciones  (www.jne.gob.pe),  the  public  organization  in 
charge  of  organizing  and  coordinating  electoral  processes,  kindly  made  available  to  us 
information on a number of characteristics pertaining to the political landscape within each 
municipality.  We  have  information  on  the  name,  political  affiliation,  and  education  of  the 
elected mayor in each municipality for the 2006 elections. In addition, we know the share of the 
vote that the elected mayor received, as well as of all other candidates standing in the mayoral 
race. We also have this information for the 2002 electoral cycle, which allows us to know if a 
given mayor was an incumbent when elected in 2006.  
 
IV.  Setup and results 
We regress the percentage of the allocated budget that is actually spent (or execution rate) 
by each municipality in 2007, 2008 and 2009 on local characteristics that capture the main 
hypotheses under consideration – namely, issues related to budget size and allocation process, 
local capacity, local needs, and political economy.  We do so for all fiscal expenditures, capital 
and  current  expenditures,  and  defined  capital  expenditures  alone.    We  focus  most  of  the 
analysis, however, on the latter because it is the component of the budget with the lowest rate 
of execution.  Our basic specification is as follows: 
 
                                                                                  
   
                                                                                     
 
Where,          represents the budget execution rate by municipality i in year t,          is 11 
 
allocated  budget,             the  share  of  the  allocated  budget  that  comes  from  the 
exploitation of natural resources,      total population in 2007,      the average number of 
years of schooling of the population aged 15 and older in 2007,           the number of white-
collar personnel as percentage of total population,      the poverty rate in 2007,            
the percentage of urban population in 2007,        the percentage of winning votes of the 
elected mayor in the 2006 elections,         a binary variable of value 1 if the elected mayor 
is  an  incumbent,  and    year-specific  effects.    Spending  data  cover  all  1,834  Peruvian 
municipalities;  however,  because  of  other  data  missing,  the  final  sample  consists  of  an 
unbalanced panel of 1,688 municipalities and 3 years of data (rendering 4,858 observations). 
The basic estimation methodology is ordinary least squares regression (OLS) with robust 
standard  errors,  clustered  by  province  (a  political  demarcation  of  adjacent 
districts/municipalities).  The results are robust to the use of weighted least squares regression 
(WLS) and median regression (MR) that controls for the influence of outliers.  In addition, we 
apply quantile regressions (QR) in order to allow the estimated effects to vary according to the 
degree of budget execution. 
Table  1  presents  the  basic  OLS  regression  results  for  total  spending,  for  spending 
disaggregated by current and capital expenditures, and for defined capital expenditures.  In 
what follows, we organize the discussion of results using the framework introduced above, 
which separates the determinants of the budget execution rate along the issues of the budget 
size and allocation process, local capacity, local needs, and political economy constraints.   
Let us first discuss the variables related to the budget.  A larger allocated budget is 
significantly  related  to  a  lower  execution  rate;  and  this  is  the  case  for  both  total  and 
disaggregated expenditures, with a larger effect on capital than current expenditures.  Thus, it 
seems to be harder to spend a larger budget, especially when this requires planning, project 
preparation, and implementation capacity.  The budget share of natural resource revenues has 
an ambiguous impact on the execution rate of total expenditures.  This ambiguity is, however, 
clarified once expenditures are disaggregated.  While for current expenditures the share of 
natural resource revenues has a significantly negative impact on the budget execution rate, for 
capital expenditures this impact is significantly positive.  This can be explained by the fact that  12 
 
Table 1: Basic Determinants of the Municipal Budget Execution Rate 
 
Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding robust t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by province. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Explanatory variables: Total Current Capital Capital Defined
Allocated Budget -12.5127*** -5.9494*** -12.0434*** -13.0507***
    (LCU, in logs) (-9.71) (-5.95) (-11.21) (-14.22)
Budget from Natural Resources 0.0340 -0.0714*** 0.1363*** 0.3185***
    (% of actual expenditure) (1.03) (-6.93) (4.62) (9.99)
Population 7.4230*** 4.4466*** 4.6245*** 7.0719***
    (in logs) (10.38) (5.75) (7.37) (11.59)
Education 1.4839*** 0.9050*** 1.3852*** 1.1866**
    (average years of schooling,  (3.26) (2.86) (2.84) (2.26)
     population over 15 years old)
Staff / Population 4.3735*** 2.8201*** 2.0742** 3.2371***
    (ratio of white-collar staff in municipality to (4.20) (3.20) (2.36) (3.16)
     population, %)
Poverty Rate 0.0311 0.0334*** 0.0829*** 0.0936***
    (% of total population) (1.50) (2.74) (3.64) (4.18)
Urban Population -0.0778*** -0.0411*** -0.0483** -0.0573***
    (% of total population) (-3.24) (-2.88) (-2.50) (-2.65)
Percentage of Winning Votes 0.1963*** 0.0540** 0.2060*** 0.1965***
    (% of votes obtained by winning Mayor) (4.79) (2.11) (4.43) (4.12)
Population Dispersion -10.4850*** -5.6197*** -2.5238 -3.4284
    (1 − normalized Herfindahl index of (-3.26) (-3.67) (-1.08) (-1.49)
     population in villages)
Incumbent Mayor -1.1441 -0.5936 -0.9901 -1.4643
    (dummy variable = 1 if incumbent, (-1.53) (-1.09) (-0.93) (-1.43)
     and 0 otherwise)
Incumbent Mayor * Year Effect 2007 5.3229*** 2.2826*** 7.1728*** 8.3761***
   (6.38) (4.06) (6.60) (7.64)
Year Effect 2007 -6.5215*** -0.0071 -10.3776*** -7.7757***
    (dummy variable = 1 if year is 2007,   (-10.57) (-0.02) (-12.28) (-8.38)
     and 0 otherwise)
Year Effect 2009 0.1366 -4.2505*** 1.4315** -4.3182***
    (dummy variable = 1 if year is 2009,   (0.24) (-10.49) (2.18) (-6.00)
     and 0 otherwise)
Constant 200.1311*** 134.3912*** 194.8805*** 177.9881***
(17.56) (17.67) (16.27) (18.54)
R-squared 0.289 0.204 0.269 0.230
No. of observation / No. of municipalities 4858 / 1688 4858 / 1688 4858 / 1688 4858 / 1688
Dependent Variable: Actual Expenditure / Allocated Budget (%)13 
 
the budget linked to natural resource revenues is earmarked mostly for capital expenditures –
earmarking encourages the intended type of expenditure, possibly at the expense of other 
types.        
Second, let us turn to the determinants related to local capacity.  Population size seems 
to  have  a  significant  effect  on  the budget execution  rate  for  both total  and disaggregated 
expenditures.    Municipalities  with  larger  populations  have  higher  execution  rates  possibly 
because they can generate a better and more diversified set of projects and have a larger pool 
of able individuals and institutions to implement them.  In a sense, population size is also 
related  to  the  first  set  of  determinants  –  on  the  magnitude  of  the  budget  –  as  larger 
populations  can  be  better  prepared  to  absorb  and  execute  a  given  budgetary  allocation.  
Another key variable determining local capacity is the level of education of the population.  The 
results show that municipalities whose people have in average more years of schooling obtain 
higher  budget  execution  rates.    This  result  is  statistically  significant  for  both  total  and 
disaggregated expenditures.  When we add to the set of explanatory variables an indicator of 
the educational level of the mayor (not shown in the table), its estimated coefficient and that of 
the average schooling of the municipality are positive but not statistically significant.  The lack 
of significance comes in part from multicollinearity and in part from the much reduced sample 
of observations: Data on the mayor’s education is self-reported and limited in coverage, cutting 
the  sample  to  one-fourth  and  biasing  it  towards  the  municipalities  with  better  educated 
mayors.  An issue repeatedly highlighted in our interviews with municipal managers is the lack 
of necessary personnel.  In order to address this issue, we include in the set of explanatory 
variables the number of white collar staff working in the municipality, as percentage of the 
population.  Its coefficient is positive and statistically significant, indicating that municipalities 
that  enjoy  a  larger professional  staff  obtain higher budget  execution  rates, for  all  kinds  of 
expenditures.   
The third set of determinants deals with the issue of local needs.  The results may 
appear surprising at first but are consistent with the hypothesis that decreasing returns applies 
also to municipal projects.  That is, other things being equal, more accomplished municipalities 
face  a  harder  time  finding  worthy  projects  to  undertake.    Municipalities  that  have  larger 14 
 
poverty rates execute a larger fraction of their allocated budget.  This result is not statistically 
significant for aggregate expenditures but is quite significant once these are disaggregated into 
current and capital expenditures.  Judging by the size of the coefficients, poverty exerts a much 
stronger pressure to execute capital than current expenditures.  Likewise, municipalities facing 
a  lower  degree  of  urbanization  seem  to  execute  a  larger  fraction  of  their  allocated 
expenditures.  This result is statistically significant for all types of expenditures, with slightly 
larger effects for capital expenditures.  It is important to remark that these results apply ceteris 
paribus, that is, once we control for the budget size, local capacity, and political economy, 
discussed next.      
Fourth, let us turn to political economy constraints.  The level of popular support for 
local authorities is arguably a key factor in their ability to conduct their plans and, therefore, 
execute their budget.  Indeed, the regression results show that municipalities where the mayor 
is elected with a larger share of the vote are able to spend a larger proportion of their allocated 
budget.  The share of the winning vote is a particularly important variable in Peru because 
mayors  are  there  elected  with  a  simple  majority,  and  in  the  fragmented  Peruvian  context 
mayors have won their election with as low as 7% of the vote. The positive effect of the share 
of the winning vote is statistically significant for both total and disaggregated expenditures, 
with a much larger estimated coefficient for capital than current expenditures.  A different, yet 
related, political economy aspect is the degree to which the population within the municipality 
is integrated and has common objectives.  There are various elements to this issue, but we 
focus on one that was repeatedly mentioned in our interviews with local authorities.  This is the 
degree of geographic dispersion of the ‘populated centers’ (or villages) within the district.  As 
expected, municipalities with a higher degree of population dispersion execute a lower fraction 
of their allocated budget.  The corresponding coefficient is negative and statistically significant 
for  total  and  current  expenditures.    In  this  basic  model,  it  does  not  quite  reach  statistical 
significant for capital expenditures; however, in a more complete model (discussed below), 
population dispersion becomes a statistically significant determinant of budget execution for 
capital expenditures as well.  Finally, we consider whether mayors who have been reelected – 
incumbents, for short – do a better job of executing the budget.  Since this effect  may be 15 
 
different over the cycle of the municipal administration, we include an interaction between the 
dummy  variable  for  incumbents  and  a  dummy  variable  for  2007,  the  first  year  of  the 
administration.  While the coefficient on the incumbent variable by itself is not statistically 
significant, the coefficient on the interaction is negative and significant, with a much larger size 
for capital than current expenditures.  It then appears that incumbent mayors execute a larger 
fraction of their budget than newly elected ones do, but only at the beginning of their term in 
office.  There is indeed a cost of adjustment that new authorities have to undergo.   
Table 2 presents three robustness exercises on the basic specification, focusing only on 
defined capital expenditures.  In the first, we eliminate the year-to-year variation in the budget 
execution rate in order to focus on the overall performance per municipality.  The dependent 
variable in this case is the sum of actual expenditures divided by the sum of allocated budget 
over the years 2007-09.  The sign, statistical significance, and even size of  most estimated 
coefficients are quite similar to those of the basic specification (compare Table 2 Col. 1 with 
Table 1 Col. 4).  The exception relates to the indicator on incumbent mayor.   In the basic 
specification it was relevant only in the first year, so it is not too surprising than when the three 
years are taken together, incumbent mayor carries an insignificant coefficient.  The last two 
exercises  attempt  to  control  for  the  influence  of  outliers.    In  Col.  2  we  present  the  basic 
specification estimated with a WLS procedure that weighs each observation proportionally to 
its  goodness  of  fit  (in  an  OLS  regression  that  excludes  it).    In  Col.  3  we  present  the  basic 
specification estimated with a quantile regression procedure that approximates the conditional 
median of the dependent variable (given the values of the explanatory variables).  The sign, 
statistical significance, and size of most estimated coefficients are similar to those estimated 
using OLS.  There is one important exception.  Under WLS, population dispersion is not only 
negative (as before) but also statistically significant.  As seen below, this variable will also gain 
significance once we augment the model to account for other budget-related variables (see 
Table 3).        
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   Table 2:  Robustness  
 
Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding robust t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by province for 
columns 1 and 2. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Explanatory variables: 3-Year Sum WLS Median Regression
Allocated Budget -13.2908*** -14.1117*** -15.2196***
    (LCU, in logs) (-15.94) (-18.52) (-27.78)
Budget from Natural Resources 0.2753*** 0.3397*** 0.3637***
    (% of actual expenditure) (9.04) (12.75) (17.79)
Population 7.4584*** 7.6935*** 8.1937***
    (in logs) (12.63) (14.50) (17.83)
Education 1.2057** 1.2295** 1.6822***
    (average years of schooling,  (2.43) (2.59) (3.28)
     population over 15 years old)
Staff / Population 5.0913*** 3.5782*** 4.5523***
    (ratio of white-collar staff in municipality to (3.18) (4.07) (5.55)
     population, %)
Poverty Rate 0.0805*** 0.0939*** 0.0927***
    (% of total population) (3.74) (4.63) (4.70)
Urban Population -0.0567*** -0.0592*** -0.0659***
    (% of total population) (-2.69) (-3.10) (-3.28)
Percentage of Winning Votes 0.1853*** 0.1939*** 0.2106***
    (% of votes obtained by winning Mayor) (3.89) (4.87) (5.39)
Population Dispersion -3.3564 -3.6300* -3.5667
    (1 − normalized Herfindahl index of (-1.40) (-1.76) (-1.56)
     population in villages)
Incumbent Mayor 1.0641 -1.3956 -1.8064*
    (dummy variable = 1 if incumbent, (1.19) (-1.56) (-1.80)
     and 0 otherwise)
Incumbent Mayor * Year Effect 2007 8.7415*** 10.7903***
   (8.99) (6.27)
Year Effect 2007 -8.0574*** -7.9973***
    (dummy variable = 1 if year is 2007,   (-9.98) (-8.83)
     and 0 otherwise)
Year Effect 2009 -4.3791*** -4.2226***
    (dummy variable = 1 if year is 2009,   (-6.96) (-5.25)
     and 0 otherwise)
Constant 190.9864*** 187.8408*** 197.6846***
(19.47) (23.64) (32.36)
R-squared (Pseudo R-squared for col. 3) 0.339 0.280 0.137
No. of observation / No. of municipalities 1688 / 1688 4858 / 1688 4858 / 1688
Dependent Variable: Actual Expenditure / Allocated Budget (%)
Capital Defined17 
 
  Next, we conduct quantile regression analysis in order to examine whether the effects 
of the explanatory variables vary according to the rate of budget execution.  Figure 3 presents a 
graphical exposition of the results.  It shows one panel per explanatory variable in the basic 
specification; in each of them, the X-axis represents the percentiles of the dependent variable, 
and the Y-axis measures the effect of the corresponding explanatory variable.  The solid line 
displays the estimated coefficients at each percentile of the dependent-variable distribution, 
with corresponding 90-percent confidence bands; and, for comparison purposes, the dotted 
line indicates the respective OLS coefficient.   
  Quantile regression results are interesting to the extent that they differ from the mean 
(OLS) or median effects.  This is the case for the variables on allocated budget, budget from 
natural resources, population, poverty rate, incumbent mayor in the first year, and year 2007.  
In  these  cases,  we  see  a  pattern  of  effects  that  varies  clearly  and  significantly  along  the 
distribution of the budget execution rate.  The general, systematic result for these explanatory 
variables is that the magnitude (i.e., absolute value) of their effects is larger when the budget 
execution rate is smaller.  This result underscores the importance of these factors especially 
when budget execution is weak.  For the other variables –education, municipal staff, urban 
population, percentage of winning votes, population dispersion, and year 2009—the quantile 
effects are not statistically different to the mean (or median) effects.  
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The  preceding discussion has focused  on  the  statistical  significance  of  the  proposed 
determinants of the budget execution rate.  To be sure, most of them appear to be statistically 
relevant.    Now,  in  order  to  ascertain  their  quantitative  importance,  we  use  the  estimated 
coefficients  from  the  basic  specification  to  gauge  the  effect  that  a  one-standard-deviation 
change in each variable has on the budget execution rate (for defined capital expenditures 
only).    The  results  are  presented  in  Figure  4.    The  most  important  variables  driving  the 
differences in budget execution rates across municipalities are the size of the allocated budget 
itself, the share of the budget whose source is natural resource exploitation, and the population 
of the district.  The importance of these variables highlights the connection between budget 
size  and  local  capacity  in  determining  the  municipalities’  ability  to  use  the  funds  that  are 
allocated to them.     
 
Figure 4: Quantitative Importance of Basic Determinants of Budget Execution Rates for 
Defined Capital Expenditures 
 
Note: the effect of each variable is derived multiplying its estimated coefficient 
in  Table  1  times  one  standard  deviation  of  the  variable  in  the  regression 
sample. 
 
Given the importance of the budget itself on driving the capacity to spend it, in Table 3 
we  explore  further  aspects  of  the  budgetary  process.    We  do  it  only  for  defined  capital 
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expenditures,  which,  as  mentioned  above,  suffer  the  most  from  low  execution  rates.      In 
column  1,  we  add  a  measure  of  the  typical  size  of  a  capital  expenditure  project  in  the 
municipality.   It  carries a  negative  and  significant  coefficient,  suggesting  that  municipalities 
facing more ambitious projects have a harder time implementing them given their capacity 
constraints.  With the inclusion of this variable, the size of the coefficient on the allocated 
budget is somewhat reduced.  In column 2, we add the proportional change in the allocated 
budget from the previous to the current year.  Its coefficient is also negative and statistically 
significant, indicating that not only the size of the budget is relevant but also how much it 
increases over time.  In the last few years, Peru has undergone a process of economic growth of 
unprecedented high rates.  This has generated a large and growing flow of resources to the 
public sector, which especially the local governments have found difficult to absorb.  Note that, 
again, the size of the coefficient on the allocated budget is a bit reduced.    
In column 3, we add a measure of the proportional increase that the budget may have 
during the current year, with respect to the initial plan.  Contrary to expectations, this variable 
is not statistically significant.  In our interviews with local authorities, we learned that the initial 
budget is usually modified along predictable lines (e.g., by including sources of revenue with 
systematic patterns), which would explain its lack of a significant effect on the capacity to plan 
and  implement  capital  expenditures.    In  column  4,  we  consider  the  issue  of  over-time 
improvement in the capacity to use the municipal budget.  We do so by interacting year dummy 
variables with the measure of allocated budget.  The year dummies correspond to 2007 and 
2009,  and,  therefore,  the  coefficients  on  the  corresponding  interactions  represent  the 
differences with respect to the budget effect in 2008.  The coefficient on the 2007 interaction is 
negative and statistically significant, while the coefficient on the 2009 interaction is significantly 
positive.  That is, in 2008 the negative effect of the budget size was smaller in magnitude than 
in 2007 but larger than in 2009.  This reveals an improvement over time in the municipal ability 
to handle a given budget size.          
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Table 3: Extended Model of Determinants of the Municipal Budget Execution Rate 
 
Numbers in parentheses are the corresponding robust t-statistics. Standard errors are clustered by province. 
*, ** and *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
Explanatory variables:
Allocated Budget -11.8088*** -10.4043*** -10.5271*** -10.5733***
    (LCU, in logs) (-12.60) (-11.25) (-11.56) (-10.47)
Projects' Size -3.5289*** -3.6741*** -3.6614*** -3.2599***
    (in terms of budget, median by district, in logs) (-7.98) (-8.42) (-8.35) (-7.42)
Change in Budget -4.4495*** -4.6667*** -3.9132***
    (log differences of budget)  (-5.82) (-6.10) (-5.09)
Within-Year Budget Increase 0.1582 0.1286
    (*modified budget − initial budget+ / initial budget)  (0.78) (0.63)
Expenditure-Year Interaction (2007) -2.9253***
    (expenditure as budgeted * year dummy 2007) (-7.02)
Expenditure-Year Interaction (2009) 1.1528**
    (expenditure as budgeted * year dummy 2009) (2.26)
Budget from Natural Resources 0.3216*** 0.2971*** 0.3009*** 0.3097***
    (% of actual expenditure) (9.95) (9.40) (9.91) (10.24)
Population 7.0738*** 6.2351*** 6.3144*** 6.5568***
    (in logs) (11.77) (10.45) (10.61) (10.85)
Education 1.2680** 1.3417** 1.3408** 1.2982**
    (average years of schooling,  (2.39) (2.54) (2.54) (2.48)
     population over 15 years old)
Staff / Population 3.0396*** 2.2110** 2.2515** 2.4375**
    (ratio of white-collar staff in municipality to (3.03) (2.33) (2.36) (2.52)
     population, %)
Poverty Rate 0.0864*** 0.0834*** 0.0845*** 0.0865***
    (% of total population) (3.85) (3.78) (3.85) (3.92)
Urban Population -0.0646*** -0.0608*** -0.0610*** -0.0623***
    (% of total population) (-2.99) (-2.88) (-2.89) (-2.94)
Percentage of Winning Votes 0.2057*** 0.2019*** 0.2013*** 0.2023***
    (% of votes obtained by winning Mayor) (4.32) (4.37) (4.37) (4.35)
Population Dispersion -4.8330** -4.5725** -4.6325** -4.6557**
    (1 − normalized Herfindahl index of (-2.11) (-2.02) (-2.05) (-2.06)
     population in villages)
Incumbent Mayor -1.2359 -1.5395 -1.5537 -1.3992
    (dummy variable = 1 if incumbent, (-1.24) (-1.52) (-1.55) (-1.42)
     and 0 otherwise)
Incumbent Mayor * Year Effect 2007 8.6224*** 9.2615*** 9.2814*** 9.1482***
   (8.08) (8.73) (8.77) (9.05)
Year Effect 2007 -5.1392*** -4.3864*** -4.3392*** 37.6245***
    (dummy variable = 1 if year is 2007,   (-5.35) (-4.42) (-4.43) (6.32)
     and 0 otherwise)
Year Effect 2009 -2.5512*** -3.5599*** -3.5623*** -20.5333***
    (dummy variable = 1 if year is 2009,   (-3.43) (-4.78) (-4.77) (-2.64)
     and 0 otherwise)
Constant 191.3344*** 181.3000*** 181.9853*** 176.5957***
(20.65) (20.20) (20.58) (16.84)
R-squared 0.243 0.252 0.252 0.264
No. of observation / No. of municipalities 4858 / 1688 4858 / 1688 4858 / 1688 4858 / 1688
Dependent Variable: Actual Expenditure / Allocated Budget (%)
Capital Defined23 
 
Next we conduct quantile regression analysis on the extended model.  The results are 
presented in Figure 5.  There, we include plots for the new budget-related variables, as well as 
for  the  variable  on  allocated  budget.    The  remaining  variables  of  the  extended  model  are 
included in the analysis but not in the graphical presentation of results, as they are quite similar 
to those in Figure 3. 
For the variables on projects’ size, (year-to-year) change in budget, as well as allocated 
budget, the estimated effects become smaller in magnitude as the budget execution rate gets 
larger.  This is similar to what we found as a general pattern in the basic specification.  For the 
variable  on  within-year  budget  increase,  the  quantile  regressions  display  a  rather  different 
pattern.  This variable carried a small and non-statistically significant coefficient under OLS 
estimation; quantile analysis shows that this mean effect is in fact masking a heterogeneous 
impact according to the degree of budget execution: for municipalities where budget execution 
is weak, an increase in budget within the year leads to smaller execution, and vice versa for 
municipalities  that  do  not  suffer  from  this  problem.    Finally,  for  the  expenditure-year 
interactions, the quantile regression coefficients are not statistically different from the mean 
(OLS) coefficients in a discernible way.   
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Figure 6 repeats the quantitative exercise presented in Figure 4, but considering also the 
new budget-related variables introduced in Table 3.  The importance of the budget size in 
driving the variation in capital budget execution rates across municipalities remains strong.  
However, the level of the allocated budget now shares some of its quantitative importance not 
only with its earmarked composition (i.e., natural resource based) but also with budget changes 
over time and the magnitude of typical capital expenditure projects.        
 
Figure 6: Quantitative Importance of Budget Execution Rates in the Extended Model 
 
Note: the effect of each variable is derived multiplying its estimated coefficient 




V.  Conclusions 
The process of fiscal decentralization in Peru is widely regarded as a key step for improving 
the  efficacy  and  governance  of public  service  delivery  in the  country.    In  a  period  of high 
growth,  as  in  recent  years,  much  was  expected  from  regional  and  municipal  governments 
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because they had substantial financial resources at their disposal.  It has been disappointing, 
however, to see that local governments have not been able to use fully their allocated budgets, 
especially  regarding  much  needed  capital  investment  projects.    This  paper  contributes  to 
understand  the  factors  that  determine  a  municipality’s  ability  to  use  the  resources  at  its 
disposal or, in simpler terms, to execute their budget.  For this purpose, the paper links detailed 
information on the fiscal accounts of most municipalities in Peru with data on key economic, 
social, and political characteristics of their jurisdictions and their elected governments.   
We study the execution rates of aggregate fiscal expenditure, as well as of its current and 
capital components, focusing on the latter because of its remarkably low execution rates.   For 
analytical convenience, we separate the determinants of the budget execution rate in four 
broad categories, related to budget size and allocation process, local capacity, local needs, and 
political economy considerations.  We find that all these groups contain independently relevant 
explanatory variables, at least in terms of statistical significance.  Moreover, using quantile 
regression  analysis,  we  find  that  the  negative  effects  tend  to  be  larger  in  magnitude  for 
municipalities  with  weaker  budget  execution  rates.    Finally,  focusing  on  the  variables’ 
quantitative impact, we must highlight the relevance of the budget size itself, its allocation 
rules, and the local capacity to absorb it.   
It stands to reason that increasing municipalities’ budgets without technical support and 
sustained  capacity-building  efforts  is  not  wise  policy.    In  Peru,  and  possibly  in  many  other 
countries as well, effective fiscal decentralization  can be achieved if budget allocations are 
matched not only with local needs, but also with local capacity.  However, in the medium term 
local capacity itself can be the target of purposeful economic policy.  Changing the incentives 
for  local  leaders  to  hire  better  public  managers,  facilitating  coordination  between  small 
municipalities for large common projects, and clarifying the different mandates of different 
levels  of  government  are  but  a  few  elements  of  much  needed,  second-generation  fiscal 
decentralization reforms.   
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Appendix: Descriptive Statistics 
 
A) Total Expenditure 
 
 
B) Current Expenditure 
 
   
Variable Year Obs. Max Median Mean Min Std. Dev.
Actual Expenditure / Allocated Budget (%) 2007 1565 100.00 75.73 72.77 4.73 18.22
2008 1619 99.64 78.29 75.72 16.24 15.82
2009 1674 99.71 76.29 73.89 15.74 14.70
2007-09 4858 100.00 76.95 74.14 4.73 16.31
Allocated Budget (in logs) 2007 1565 20.93 14.86 15.03 13.02 1.19
2008 1619 20.97 15.09 15.24 13.07 1.22
2009 1674 21.12 15.26 15.39 13.24 1.23
2007-09 4858 21.12 15.06 15.22 13.02 1.23
Change in Budget  2007 1565 1.74 0.28 0.35 -0.94 0.35
(log differences of budget)  2008 1619 1.76 0.22 0.22 -0.90 0.28
2009 1674 1.91 0.13 0.16 -1.42 0.31
2007-09 4858 1.91 0.20 0.24 -1.42 0.33
Variable Year Obs. Max Median Mean Min Std. Dev.
Actual Expenditure / Allocated Budget (%) 2007 1565 100.00 92.17 89.60 7.90 10.03
2008 1619 100.00 91.13 88.31 5.33 10.33
2009 1674 100.00 85.08 83.20 18.77 11.43
2007-09 4858 100.00 89.61 86.97 5.33 10.98
Allocated Budget (in logs) 2007 1565 20.17 13.50 13.76 11.79 1.27
2008 1619 20.21 13.64 13.89 11.93 1.28
2009 1674 20.24 13.82 14.03 12.01 1.29
2007-09 4858 20.24 13.66 13.90 11.79 1.29
Change in Budget 2007 1565 2.27 0.15 0.18 -0.88 0.26
(log differences of budget)  2008 1619 2.00 0.12 0.14 -1.89 0.23
2009 1674 1.60 0.15 0.17 -0.93 0.22
2007-09 4858 2.27 0.14 0.16 -1.89 0.2431 
 
C) Capital Expenditure 
 
 









Variable Year Obs. Max Median Mean Min Std. Dev.
Actual Expenditure / Allocated Budget (%) 2007 1565 100.00 67.44 65.17 3.89 23.01
2008 1619 99.80 73.69 71.06 9.74 18.95
2009 1674 100.00 72.44 70.51 12.49 17.48
2007-09 4858 100.00 71.71 68.97 3.89 20.06
Allocated Budget (in logs) 2007 1565 20.30 14.43 14.59 12.05 1.18
2008 1619 20.35 14.73 14.86 12.31 1.23
2009 1674 20.59 14.91 15.01 12.43 1.24
2007-09 4858 20.59 14.69 14.83 12.05 1.23
Change in Budget 2007 1565 2.73 0.36 0.44 -1.19 0.48
(log differences of budget)  2008 1619 2.27 0.27 0.28 -1.20 0.39
2009 1674 2.52 0.11 0.17 -1.69 0.42
2007-09 4858 2.73 0.23 0.29 -1.69 0.44
Variable Year Obs. Max Median Mean Min Std. Dev.
Actual Expenditure / Allocated Budget (%) 2007 1565 100.00 66.19 64.34 3.89 23.45
2008 1619 99.72 69.84 67.85 8.14 19.77
2009 1674 100.00 64.62 63.19 9.42 18.70
2007-09 4858 100.00 66.83 65.11 3.89 20.77
Allocated Budget (in logs) 2007 1565 20.25 14.36 14.46 11.27 1.31
2008 1619 20.31 14.63 14.70 10.60 1.38
2009 1674 20.38 14.69 14.70 9.25 1.41
2007-09 4858 20.38 14.55 14.62 9.25 1.37
Change in Budget 2007 1565 2.73 0.33 0.38 -1.59 0.54
(log differences of budget)  2008 1619 2.73 0.25 0.25 -1.86 0.45
2009 1674 2.74 0.01 0.02 -3.01 0.44
2007-09 4858 2.74 0.17 0.21 -3.01 0.5032 
 
E) Other Variables 
 
 
Variable Obs. Max Median Mean Min Std. Dev.
Projects' Size (in logs) 4858 12.72 8.95 8.98 2.30 0.91
Within-Year Budget Increase 4858 83.58 0.99 1.47 -0.77 2.49
Budget from Natural Resources (%) 4858 98.30 29.71 32.98 0.00 26.17
Population (in logs) 1688 15.83 8.48 8.67 5.50 1.48
Education (average yrs of schooling) 1688 5.33 2.27 2.34 0.40 0.70
Staff / Population (%) 4858 9.59 0.26 0.37 0.00 0.46
Poverty Rate (%) 1688 99.72 62.40 58.73 1.26 22.67
Urban Population (%) 1688 100.00 40.92 46.61 1.31 29.89
Percentage of Winning Votes (%) 1688 77.06 27.19 28.70 6.83 9.05
Population Dispersion 1688 1.00 0.88 0.78 0.00 0.27
Incumbent Mayor 1688 1.00 0.00 0.21 0.00 0.41
    